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Abstract 1 
 2 
We examined the finding that aesthetic evaluations are more similar across observers for 3 
representational images than for abstract images. It had been proposed that a difference in 4 
convergence of observers’ tastes was due to differing levels of shared semantic associations 5 
[Vessel, E.A. and Rubin, N., 2010, Beauty and the beholder: Highly individual taste for 6 
abstract, but not real-world images. Journal of Vision, 10 (2), 1-14]. In Experiment 1, student 7 
participants rated 20 representational and 20 abstract artworks. We found that their 8 
judgments were more similar for representational than abstract artworks. In Experiment 2, 9 
we replicated this finding, and also found that valence ratings given to associations and 10 
meanings provided in response to the artworks converged more across observers for 11 
representational than for abstract art. Our empirical work provides insight into processes that 12 
may underlie the observation that taste for representational art is shared across individual 13 
observers, while taste for abstract art is more idiosyncratic.  14 
 15 
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Introduction 1 
 2 
What people find beautiful governs decisions and behavior in a wide range of circumstances, 3 
and understanding the nature of aesthetic preferences is an important challenge to 4 
psychologists. The field of aesthetics has traditionally used works of art as a test-bed for 5 
theories, though theories of aesthetics also apply to every-day objects and consumer items 6 
and have many applications. 7 
 8 
In broad terms, the aesthetic appreciation of a work of art has been found to be influenced 9 
by two factors: the visual properties of the work of art, and the cognitive and emotional 10 
attributes of the individual observing the artwork (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004; 11 
Lindell & Mueller, 2011; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). Among the many properties 12 
of an artwork that influences aesthetic appreciation are its complexity (Berlyne, 1974; Nadal, 13 
Munar, Marty, & Cela-Conde, 2010), contrast (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999) symmetry 14 
(Frith & Nias, 1974; Humphrey, 1997; Jacobsen & Hofel, 2002), and color (Martindale & 15 
Moore, 1998) with color acquiring, through a process of association, the positive or negative 16 
valence of objects that typically have that color (Palmer & Schloss, 2010; Palmer, Schloss, & 17 
Sammartino, 2013; Taylor, Schloss, Palmer & Franklin, 2013). Attributes of the perceiver 18 
that influence an aesthetic experience include their expertise (Leder, Gerger, Dressler, & 19 
Schabmann, 2012; Winston & Cupchik, 1992), understanding and knowledge (Gordon, 20 
1952; Martindale, 1984), their familiarity with the art (Berlyne, 1970), personality (Feist & 21 
Brady, 2004), current emotional state and mood (Forgas, 1995), cognitive analysis (Leder, et 22 
al., 2004) and ease with which they perceive the art  (Forster, Leder & Ansorge, 2013; Reber 23 
et al., 2004; Zajonc, 1980). It is therefore clear that many factors influence aesthetic 24 
appreciation and a detailed model of how these operate to govern an aesthetic response 25 
has been provided by Leder, et al. (2004) (for reviews see also Jacobsen, 2010; Leder, 26 
2013; Lindell & Mueller, 2011; Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino,  2013).  27 
 28 
4 
 
Given the complex interplay between the visual attributes of a work of art, a person’s 1 
individual characteristics, and even the social context in which the art is viewed (Leder et al. 2 
2004), it might be expected that aesthetic preferences will always be highly subjective and 3 
difficult to predict. However, one aspect of an artwork that influences liking in a highly 4 
consistent and predictable way is its level of representational content. It has frequently been 5 
found that representational art is liked more than abstract art (Gordon, 1952; Heinrichs & 6 
Cupchik, 1985; Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006; Mastandrea, 7 
Bartoli, & Carrus, 2011; Winston & Cupchik, 1992; see also Leder, et al., 2012). As Landau 8 
et al. (2006) suggest, a possible reason for this is that people do not like art (or other items) 9 
that they find meaningless (Leder et al. 2004; Leder, Carbon, & Ripsas, 2006; Martindale, 10 
1984). In fact, Martindale (1984) suggests in his ‘meaning from art’ proposal, that the 11 
number and diversity of associations elicited by a work of art reflect a person’s 12 
understanding and determine the level of aesthetic appreciation, with a large number of 13 
diverse associations producing maximum pleasure. 14 
 15 
Clearly, a feeling of meaninglessness in response to a work of art may depend on the 16 
experience and personality of the observer (Landau et al., 2006; Leder et al., 2004) and 17 
evidence indicates that a greater liking of abstract art is associated with greater knowledge 18 
and expertise of art (Gordon, 1952; Hekkert & van Wieringen, 1996; Winston & Cupchik, 19 
1992), higher levels of education, and greater openness to ideas (Feist & Brady, 2004; see 20 
also Leder et al., 2012).  If viewers are able to find meaning, or if they are experienced with 21 
abstract art, then this increases their appreciation of abstract art (Feist & Brady, 2004; 22 
Landau et al., 2006; Leder et al., 2012). However, naïve observers of art predictably prefer 23 
representational artworks to abstract artworks (Winston & Cupchik, 1992). 24 
 25 
A further difference between the aesthetic appreciation of representational and abstract 26 
images was recently reported by Vessel and Rubin (2010). Vessel and Rubin examined the 27 
consistency of preferences for photographs of realistic scenes versus abstract scenes 28 
5 
 
(pictures taken from a range of sources, including geological images, 3D rendering software, 1 
microscopic images, fractal images and kaleidoscopic images). They found that the 2 
aesthetic appreciation of realistic images was more consistent across observers than that of 3 
abstract images. Therefore, in addition to abstract images being liked less, people appear to 4 
have a more varied response to them. 5 
 6 
Vessel and Rubin explain the higher agreement in preferences for representational 7 
compared to abstract images as being caused by the meaning and associations elicited by 8 
the different types of images. They suggest that semantic associations are more likely to be 9 
shared between individuals for meaningful/realistic images (e.g. a scenic view) than abstract 10 
images, and that the valence of the associations elicited influences the preferences for the 11 
images. For example, most people when viewing a photograph of a scenic garden will have 12 
a pleasant association which may result in a positive evaluation of the photograph (see also 13 
Leder et al., 2004). Conversely, looking at a photograph of a concrete car park may elicit a 14 
negative association and result in a more negative evaluation of the photograph. This 15 
process may cause preferences to be consistent across observers for representational 16 
images. In contrast, Vessel and Rubin argue, responses to abstract images are likely to be 17 
more variable and highly subjective, and the individual nature of the associations elicited 18 
causes the preferences for the images to be more variable. If valid, Vessel and Rubin’s 19 
(2010) findings are important in furthering our understanding of aesthetic appreciation as 20 
they suggest that the valence of the semantic association elicited by an image may be a 21 
major influence in determining aesthetic appreciation.  22 
 23 
The aim of the current work was to further examine the cross-observer similarity of the 24 
appreciation of representational as opposed to abstract images. To investigate a number of 25 
additional questions that arise from Vessel and Rubin’s work, we made several changes to 26 
the methodology. First of all, we wanted to explore whether Vessel and Rubin’s observations 27 
applied to evaluations of artworks. Vessel and Rubin (2010) used photographs and images 28 
6 
 
that were of a photo-realistic appearance rather than works of art and, while similar results 1 
can be predicted for artworks, this may not be the case because works of art are rarely as 2 
accurate in their representations as photographs. Moreover, works of art, by their very 3 
nature, might be expected by a viewer to have some originality, and not to be a simple copy 4 
of reality (see Leder et al., 2004). Works of art may also be expected to have a higher level 5 
of ambiguity (see Jakesch & Leder, 2009), which may influence the evaluations given by 6 
viewers and the similarity across raters. We therefore tested whether higher cross-observer 7 
similarity would be shown for representational works of art compared to abstract works of 8 
art. A further methodological difference was the collection of ratings rather than forced 9 
choice preferences. We were interested in gaining a measure of art evaluation that was not 10 
comparative in relation to other images, but, rather, independent for each image, and related 11 
to a graded scale rather than a binary judgment. Finally, our study was self-paced, with 12 
participants setting their own viewing time per image, as opposed to the second per image 13 
used in Vessel and Rubin. We felt one second was too fast for artworks, as Smith and Smith 14 
(2001) observed that the mean viewing time per artwork in a gallery was 27 seconds 15 
(median 17 seconds). Based on Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) work, it was predicted that the 16 
ratings for “liking”, for representational works of art would be more similar across individuals 17 
than ratings for abstract works of art.  18 
 19 
Experiment 1 20 
 21 
Method 22 
 23 
Participants 24 
 25 
Twenty students from the University of Chester participated in the study, which received 26 
ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of 27 
Chester, and complied with British Psychological Society ethical guidelines. 28 
7 
 
 1 
 2 
Materials  3 
 4 
Digital images of non-famous artworks found in a variety of locations on the internet (located 5 
via Google image search) were gathered by the authors. We chose non-famous artworks to 6 
reduce the probability that observers knew the work and had already formed an opinion 7 
about the work, or had been exposed to others’ opinions of the work. Twenty abstract and 8 
twenty representational artworks were chosen. A sample of artworks can be seen in Figure 9 
1, and a detailed list of the artworks can be found in the Supplementary Information. We 10 
classed artworks as representational if they resembled the ordinary shapes and colors of the 11 
entities represented, thus excluding artworks in which shapes were grossly distorted, or in 12 
which colors were unusual for the objects depicted, as, for example in representational 13 
expressionist artworks, which might feature content such as blue horses. The abstract 14 
artworks contained no recognizable objects, but could include shapes. We selected the forty 15 
artworks from an initially longer list on the basis of the consensus that the artworks reflected 16 
a range of attractiveness and colorfulness, and that the overall set contained a variety of 17 
topics, forms and styles. Note that consensus was established via independent completion 18 
of selection sheets by authors AS, PR and JK, followed by collation of those responses and 19 
a detailed discussion.  20 
 21 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here, see FIGURE 1 CAPTION below] 22 
  23 
8 
 
 1 
FIGURE 1 CAPTION  2 
Figure 1: Sample abstract and representational artwork, reproduced with permission from 3 
the artists. Copyright remains with the artists named in the caption. Top row, left to right a) 4 
Tony Broadbent: In a Minute b) Pol Ledent: Abstract 882140 c) Fons Heijnsbroek: 5 
Open/Close d) Arie Koning: The Source. Bottom row, left to right e) Ian Sheldon: Peeling 6 
Wallpaper f) Jean Smith: Laughter #4 g) Mark Peterson: ’55 Thunderbird h) Nancy Howe: 7 
Strange Night. Please note that, while aspect ratios have been maintained, the image sizes 8 
for the artworks have been scaled to fit this figure and do not reflect actual sizes.  9 
 10 
The twenty representational artworks were placed in a random order, and the twenty 11 
abstract artworks were also placed in a random order, and booklets were created, featuring 12 
first the representational and then the abstract artworks. The same random order was used 13 
for all participants. In replication of Vessel and Rubin (2010), we did not counterbalance 14 
block order. The blocked presentation was chosen because mixed presentation had shown 15 
substantially lower convergence than blocked presentation in Vessel and Rubin’s 16 
Experiment 2 in comparison to their Experiment 1.   17 
 18 
Booklets were printed in color, with one artwork per white A4 page, centered horizontally. 19 
Below each artwork five questions were printed and below each question there was a rating 20 
scale, with two anchor words (most negative on the left, most positive on the right) and 21 
between the anchors were the digits 1 – 7. The questions were “On a scale of 1 to 7 please 22 
rate how much you like the picture” (anchors “dislike”, “like”), “On a scale of 1 to 7 please 23 
rate how negative/positive you find the picture” (anchors “negative”, positive”), “On a scale 24 
of 1 to 7 please rate how interesting you find the picture (anchors “uninteresting”, 25 
“interesting”), “On a scale of 1 to 7 please rate how attractive you find the picture” (anchors 26 
“unattractive”, “attractive”),  “On a scale of 1 to 7 please rate how colorful you find the 27 
picture (anchors: “not colorful“, “colorful”).  28 
9 
 
 1 
Procedure 2 
 3 
Participants were tested individually at a desk in a quiet place. Following participant 4 
information and written consent procedures, participants were asked to provide ratings of the 5 
artworks along the dimensions stated. We asked participants to rate each picture 6 
independently, not comparing it to other pictures in the set, as we wanted to maximize the 7 
likelihood that that we would obtain independent ratings for each artwork. We did not set any 8 
time limits, but, indicatively, told participants that their participation would take a maximum of 9 
thirty minutes, but that for most people the duration would probably be shorter (cf. Smith & 10 
Smith, 2001). After having received the instructions, participants worked their way through 11 
the booklet in a sequential order, circling their response to each of the five questions for 12 
each of the forty artworks until the booklet was fully completed.  13 
 14 
 15 
Results and Discussion 16 
 17 
Data sets for two participants had to be discarded, because of missing data.  The remaining 18 
18 participants provided full data sets which were used in the analysis. 19 
 20 
Our main point of interest was the similarity of the ratings across participants. To test this, 21 
we first needed a measure that captured the interrelatedness of the rater’s responses to the 22 
artworks. For this purpose, we calculated the pairwise correlations between all raters, 23 
following Vessel and Rubin (2010). In our case, the correlations were based on ordinal 24 
scales, so we computed Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. We did this separately for 25 
abstract and representational artworks, and for each rating measure taken. In the second 26 
part of the analysis, also following Vessel and Rubin (2010), we compared all pairwise 27 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients with a test for differences. In our case, the appropriate 28 
10 
 
test for differences was pairwise (because each inter-rater correlation coefficient from the 1 
abstract artworks had a counterpart in the representational artwork). Distribution testing 2 
using a series of Shapiro-Wilk tests showed non-normal distributions in at least one member 3 
of each of the five of these pairs, so the test of difference chosen was a non-parametric 4 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, for which we report Z and p in Table 1, alongside the mean 5 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, and the corresponding SEMs. 6 
 7 
 8 
 
Representational  Abstract  Wilcoxon 
 
 
Mean rho SEM Mean rho SEM Z p 
attractiveness .382 .020 .172 .023 -6.967 < .001 
colorfulness .498 .016 .553 .014 -3.116 .002 
interest .167 .021 .167 .019 -.052 .959 
liking .325 .020 .106 .020 -7.554 <.001 
negativity/positivity .537 .014 .393 .019 -6.584 < .001 
           9 
Table 1: Mean of all pairwise Spearman rank correlation coefficients and SEMs for abstract 10 
and representational artworks in Experiment 1, with Z and p values for their pairwise 11 
differences using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, with N = 153. 12 
 13 
The ratings for attractiveness, liking and negativity / positivity were significantly more similar 14 
across individuals for the representational than for the abstract items. Interestingly the 15 
ratings for colorfulness showed a difference in the opposite direction, as ratings were 16 
significantly more similar across participants for abstract than representational artworks. The 17 
level of inter-rater similarity for interest did not differ across the two types of artwork. 18 
 19 
11 
 
We ran an additional analysis, which had the purpose of examining whether participants’ 1 
opinions of abstract works of art differed from those of representational works of art, in 2 
replication of prior work (e.g. Gordon, 1952; Landau, et al 2006; Augustin & Leder, 2006; 3 
Leder et al. 2012). The main purpose of this was to examine if our data replicated this well-4 
documented effect, by way of calibration.  Five paired-samples t-tests were run, in which the 5 
mean by-subject rating across twenty artworks for each category formed the dependent 6 
variable, and art type (representational, abstract) the independent variable. Means, SDs t, 7 
and p-values are presented in Table 2. For all measures, abstract art was rated significantly 8 
lower than representational art, replicating previous work. 9 
 10 
representational abstract
mean SEM mean SEM t(17) p 
attractiveness 4.13 .16 2.98 .21 6.70 < .001 
colorfulness 4.24 .12 3.68 .15 3.75    .002 
interest 3.96 .14 3.12 .21 5.06 < .001 
liking 4.49 .13 3.13 .22 5.85 < .001 
negativity/positivity 4.70 .09 3.43 .12 11.04 < .001 
 11 
Table 2: Means and SEMs for ratings of representational and abstract images in Experiment 12 
1, with t and p values for the contrast in the final columns. 13 
 14 
Our primary finding of Experiment 1 extends Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) finding that viewer 15 
evaluations of representational images converge more than those of abstract images, at 16 
least on measures of taste (liking, attractiveness) and global valence (negativity / positivity). 17 
This generalizes their original finding, which used photorealistic images, to artworks. It also 18 
shows that the finding is robust under a different methodology. However, our finding does 19 
not address a key issue, which was also not directly addressed in Vessel and Rubin’s work. 20 
12 
 
This concerns the claim that the valence generated by the  semantic associations is a key 1 
component of the process by which the convergent and divergent views arise in response to 2 
representational and abstract artworks, respectively (see Vessel & Rubin, e.g. p. 10). 3 
Experiment 2 aims to address this. Experiment 2 also remedies the lack of counterbalancing 4 
of block order that somewhat affects the interpretation of Experiment 1.  5 
 6 
It is interesting to note that for colorfulness the difference was significant in the opposite 7 
direction, i.e. it showed greater convergence for abstract than representational artworks, 8 
which could indicate that raters pay more attention to color in abstract artwork than in 9 
representational artwork. This was not the main focus of our research, so it is not pursued in 10 
Experiment 2, but we will return to this briefly in the Discussion. 11 
 12 
 13 
Experiment 2 14 
 15 
Vessel and Rubin emphasize that finding meaning in an image can lead to an increased 16 
cross-observer similarity in preferences for realistic images in comparison to abstract 17 
images. They claim that this can be due to shared negative associations leading to shared 18 
low levels of liking and shared positive associations leading to shared high levels of liking. 19 
Although Vessel and Rubin’s work is highly persuasive in showing that the presence of 20 
meaning in a representational image leads to higher levels of similarity in preferences across 21 
observers than is the case for less meaningful abstract images, they did not directly measure 22 
the valence of the associations generated by an image, nor whether these associations also 23 
showed high levels of similarity across observers.   24 
 25 
In this experiment, we further examined the proposal that the valence of semantic 26 
associations for artworks diverge for abstract art and converge for representational art. As a 27 
work of art can have multiple associations, each of which may vary in valence, our method of 28 
13 
 
measuring association valence had to reflect this. We therefore adapted the Unique 1 
Corporate Association Valence (UCAV) measure, which was developed by Spears, Brown, 2 
and Dacin (2006) to quantify the valence of the associations elicited by consumer brands. 3 
The original UCAV involves people writing down brief descriptions that come to mind when 4 
presented with a brand and then self-rating the valence of their description on a three point 5 
scale. Averaging the scores of the descriptions gives an overall measure of the valence of 6 
the combined associations elicited by a brand. By asking participants to write down their own 7 
unique associations and score their valence, the UCAV is able to capture the subjective 8 
aspect of the elicited association, while enabling a quantitative measure of the valence of 9 
each association, and the valence of all those associations combined. In their study Spears 10 
et al. found that the valence of associations elicited by specific brands, as measured by the 11 
UCAV, significantly correlated with the overall evaluation of a brand (r = .71). They 12 
concluded that associations were a powerful factor in determining brand liking and that the 13 
UCAV was able to reliably measure the valence of brand associations. 14 
 15 
To examine the proposal that convergence in tastes in artworks is stronger for 16 
representational than abstract art due to shared associations, we asked participants to 17 
complete an adapted UCAV in response to a series of abstract and representational 18 
artworks. We also gathered participants’ responses via rating scales. The main aim of this 19 
study was to examine whether there was greater convergence for representational artworks 20 
than for abstract artworks on the UCAV scores. The rating scales served to provide further 21 
calibration.  22 
 23 
 24 
  25 
14 
 
Method 1 
 2 
Participants 3 
 4 
Twenty four adults (mean age: 30.5 years, SD = 15.29, range = 19-63 years) participated in 5 
the study (9 males, 15 females). One further participant was tested, but yielded an 6 
incomplete dataset, and was replaced. The participants were recruited via opportunity 7 
sampling with the majority of participants being undergraduate students from the University 8 
of Chester. None of the participants had participated in Experiment 1. Ethical approval for 9 
this research was given by the University of Chester Psychology Department Ethics 10 
Committee and the research complied with the ethical code of conduct of the British 11 
Psychological Society. 12 
 13 
Materials 14 
 15 
Twenty two images of artworks were selected for the experiment. Half were representational 16 
and half were abstract, using the same definitions as for Experiment 1. Again, all images 17 
were by non-famous artists and were obtained from online databases, with the 18 
representational artworks depicting a range of different scenes and the abstract art using a 19 
range of styles. The image set overlapped in part with that used in Experiment 1, but 20 
contained some artworks not used in Experiment 1, because they were chosen as part of a 21 
separate, independent project. The images were printed on A4 paper, without any text. 22 
Details of the images used can be found in the Supplementary Information. 23 
 24 
Response booklets containing UCAV materials, adapted from Spears, et al. (2006), and 25 
containing ratings scales were prepared, with one sheet of each for each of the artworks and 26 
a separate sheet for each type of rating. UCAV sheets in these booklets provided five to-be-27 
completed rectangular text boxes occupying the left-hand side of the sheet, with the UCAV 28 
15 
 
scoring symbols presented to the right of each box. As stated before, the original UCAV 1 
used a three point scale (+ 0 - ) to rate associations. We increased this to a five point scale, - 2 
-, -, 0, +, and ++ (translated into 1 – 5, respectively at scoring) to increase the sensitivity, 3 
with the aim of measuring a greater range of association valence values.  Separate rating 4 
scale sheets presented 7-point scales measuring four ratings: Liking (1 = dislike, 7 = like), 5 
Positivity (1 = negative, 7 = very positive), Interest (1 = uninteresting, 7 = very interesting) 6 
and Attractiveness (1 = unattractive, 7 = very attractive), with all numbers presented in a 7 
horizontal line, with anchors on either side. Note that the anchors vary somewhat from those 8 
in Experiment 1, potentially widening the scale somewhat, and do not contain the rating 9 
“colorful”. The omission of colorfulness had the advantage that it did not risk creating a focus 10 
on color as an important dimension in participants’ liking, as may potentially have been the 11 
case in Experiment 1. 12 
 13 
Procedure 14 
 15 
All participants were tested individually. Each participant viewed the 22 artworks (11 realistic 16 
and 11 abstract) and for each artwork they completed the four Likert rating scales (Liking, 17 
Positivity, Interest, Attractiveness) for all the artworks in one block, and the UCAV measure 18 
for all the artworks in a different block. Before completing the UCAV participants were given 19 
the following instructions: “please write a word or short description in the boxes below of any 20 
thoughts that the work of art brought to mind. Please try to complete a minimum of three 21 
boxes and then please circle how positive, neutral or negative the description is”.  To control 22 
for order effects, the order in which participants completed the rating scales and UCAV 23 
blocks was counterbalanced, as was the order in which they viewed blocks of 24 
representational and abstract artworks. Between completing the rating scales and UCAV all 25 
participants completed the 18-item Need for Cognition scale (NFC, Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 26 
1984). This was intended to be a control for participants’ motivation to write text, but in the 27 
event, this measure showed no significant associations or differences in any statistics, so it 28 
16 
 
does not feature in the results. The completion of the whole study took approximately 40 1 
minutes. 2 
 3 
Results 4 
 5 
UCAV scores were calculated for each participant’s rating of each artwork by averaging the 6 
participant’s score given to all associations for that artwork. We also counted the number of 7 
words written by each person in response to each artwork. Rating values given to all other 8 
scales were also entered as data.  9 
We conducted the same similarity analysis as for Experiment 1, but, for this analysis only, 10 
one participant’s data had to be excluded, because this participant had responded without 11 
any variance to the abstract artworks (giving uniform ratings of 1), which prevented the set of 12 
correlation coefficients between that participant and the other participants from being 13 
computed. For one further participant, one missing datapoint was estimated using the mean 14 
for that condition. Pairwise Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were computed, and 15 
compared, once again, with Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests, due to non-normality of the 16 
distributions. 17 
 18 
One focal analysis concerned a replication of the pattern observed in Experiment 1 in 19 
relation to the “liking” scores, which had shown significantly stronger similarity for 20 
representational than abstract work. This pattern was replicated in the current study, with a 21 
significantly higher mean Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for representational than 22 
abstract artworks on this rating, replicating the findings of Experiment 1, with a new set of 23 
participants, and a slightly different (and smaller) set of artworks (see Table 3).  The other 24 
rating measures showed a similar pattern, with the exception of “interest”, which showed a 25 
numerically, but not significantly, larger mean Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for 26 
abstract than representational artworks.  27 
  28 
17 
 
 1 
Table 3:  2 
 Representational  Abstract  Wilcoxon  
 Mean rho SEM Mean rho SEM Z p 
Attractiveness .405 .017 .068 .020 -10.197 < .001 
Interest .039 .022 .077 .019 -1.340 .180 
Liking .212 .020 .015 .020 -6.550  < .001 
Positivity .440 .020 .176 .023 -9.499 < .001 
UCAV .286 .020 .032 .023 -8.417 < .001 
 3 
Table 3:  Mean of all pairwise Spearman rank correlation coefficients  and SEMs for abstract 4 
and representational images in Experiment 2, with Z and p values for their pairwise 5 
differences using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, with N = 253. 6 
 7 
The key extension to Experiment 1 was the inclusion of the UCAV scores. Convergence of 8 
these was significantly higher for representational than abstract artworks (see Table 3), 9 
which, for the first time, provides evidence that the valence of associations converges to a 10 
greater extent in response to representational than in response to abstract artworks.  11 
 12 
Finally, the mean rho values in Experiment 2 were lower than in Experiment 1. The likeliest 13 
reason for this is that the rho values in this experiment were based on 11 items, while in 14 
Experiment 1 they were based on 20 items. However, the difference between the correlation 15 
coefficients remains robust, showing that the effect replicates under different sample size 16 
parameters for both items and raters. 17 
 18 
18 
 
In addition to testing our primary hypothesis, we ran a calibrating analysis to check whether, 1 
as in Experiment 1, representational artworks were given more favorable evaluations overall, 2 
and, additionally, whether they attracted a larger number of words in response. The results 3 
of these analyses are in Table 4, which shows that, for all rating measures except 4 
attractiveness, the mean rating for representational artworks was significantly higher than 5 
that for abstract artworks. This replicates our findings from Experiment 1, as well as patterns 6 
in the literature. The UCAV scores did not differ significantly (though note that the means 7 
differed in the same direction as the rating scales, and the difference approached 8 
significance). The number of words produced in response to representational artworks was 9 
significantly higher than the number elicited by abstract artworks. This is likely to be a 10 
reflection of the fact that meaning is more readily available in the representational artworks. 11 
 12 
 13 
Representational Abstract Difference 
Mean SEM Mean SEM t(23) p 
Liking 4.23 .16 3.61 .27 2.18 .04 
Positivity 4.24 .13 3.64 .21 2.63 .01 
Interest 4.16 .18 3.51 .26 2.32 .03 
Attractiveness 4.12 .16 3.59 .26 1.82 .08 
UCAV 3.31 .07 3.07 .13 1.81 .08 
Number of words 6.61 1.03 5.33 .83 3.20 .004 
 14 
Table 4: Means and SEMs for representational and abstract images in Experiment 2, with t 15 
and p values for the contrast in the final columns. 16 
 17 
We ran a further exploratory test, to examine the idea that associations may be a greater 18 
driver of liking in representational than in abstract art. To test this we checked whether the 19 
UCAV scores correlated significantly more strongly with liking in representational artworks 20 
19 
 
than abstract artworks, examining this by items. Using Spearman’s rho, the UCAV scores 1 
correlated strongly and significantly with liking ratings for abstract artworks, rho = .612, N = 2 
11, p = .023 (one-tailed), while the two measures correlated very strongly and significantly 3 
for representational artworks, rho = .918, N = 11, p < .001 (one-tailed), with the correlation 4 
coefficients differing significantly from each other using a Fisher Z transformation (see Myers 5 
& Sirois, 2004), Z = -1.73, p = 0.04, (one-tailed). This finding suggests that associations 6 
drive liking to a greater extent in representational than in abstract work.   7 
 8 
Finally, we ran a control analysis to examine whether the UCAV scores correlated with the 9 
number of words used in the UCAV task. This was to check whether the quantity and quality 10 
of the associative material elicited correlated. In neither the abstract (rho = .45, N = 11, p = 11 
.447) nor the representational artworks (rho = .219, N = 11, p = .259) was this the case. The 12 
two measures did not differ from each other, Z = -0.36, p = 0.7188 (two-tailed). This 13 
suggests that, while representational artworks elicited a higher quantity of verbal response 14 
material, the quantity of verbal responses did not show any relationship with the valence of 15 
the associations elicited. Importantly, this lack of association between quantity and valence 16 
did not appear to differ for representational and abstract artworks. Thus, the number of 17 
words does not appear to be linked to the valence of the associations, and therefore the 18 
valence of the association appears independent of the quantity. 19 
 20 
 21 
Discussion 22 
 23 
We tested whether liking for representational art converges across participants to a larger 24 
extent than liking for abstract art, and both our experiments showed this to be the case, with 25 
significant differences in convergence demonstrated twice, with different participants and 26 
partly differing sets of artworks. These findings replicate Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) work, 27 
using a different methodology. This finding in itself strengthens their claims. 28 
20 
 
 1 
In addition, our data from Experiment 2 showed that, when viewer associations were elicited, 2 
and when these associations and responses were rated by the viewers for valence, the 3 
valence converged across viewers to a significantly larger extent for representational 4 
artworks than for abstract artworks. This extends Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) work 5 
significantly. On the basis of their own findings, Vessel and Rubin had proposed that the 6 
internal states of multiple viewers are more similar due to the shared meaning inherent in 7 
realistic images. However, they inferred this from the levels of convergence observed in their 8 
data without probing the inferred internal processes directly. Our finding provides evidence 9 
about the internal processes that might lead to convergence. As shown, our viewers 10 
generated a series of verbal responses, which externalized their reactions to the artworks, 11 
and then rated the valence of their self-generated responses. These ratings did indeed 12 
converge to a larger extent for representational artworks than abstract artworks. While our 13 
evidence does not show that the precise content of the meaning is shared across 14 
participants, it does show that the valence attributed to that content is shared across 15 
different viewers. Thus, while Vessel and Rubin hypothesize that shared semantic content is 16 
at the root of the convergence difference, our work provides more specific evidence to 17 
support this hypothesis. It is possible to pursue this issue even further in the future by 18 
devising a method which can measure the semantic overlap between the responses different 19 
viewers generate, but this is beyond the scope of the current research. 20 
 21 
We ran a number of calibrating analyses for Experiment 2. In the first, we wanted to 22 
compare our findings against the original UCAV. In the original UCAV, Spears et al. (2006) 23 
found that the liking for a brand correlated strongly and significantly with the UCAV scores 24 
generated by the brand. Our work calibrates well with this finding, as in both abstract and 25 
realistic artworks, the UCAV score correlated significantly with the liking ratings. 26 
Interestingly, we also found that the correlation between UCAV scores and liking ratings was 27 
significantly stronger for the representational art than for the abstract art, which provides a 28 
21 
 
separate source of evidence to suggest that meaning and associations drive the 1 
appreciation of representational art more than the appreciation of abstract art. The 2 
observation in Experiment 1 that inter-rater similarity was higher for colorfulness in abstract 3 
than representational artwork may also be suggestive of the converse. It is possible that 4 
color, rather than meaning, might determine the response to artworks to a greater extent for 5 
abstract than representational art, although this evidence is not conclusive. Nevertheless, 6 
the combined observations raise the possibility that the appreciation of abstract art may be 7 
more driven by visual properties of the artworks, but this specific issue needs to be probed 8 
more deeply in future research, as our current research does not provide further direct 9 
evidence on this. 10 
 11 
In an additional calibration, both Experiment 1 and 2 found that participants liked realistic 12 
artworks more than abstract artworks. This replicates previous research, and because of the 13 
use of unfamiliar works of art rather than artworks by famous artists (e.g. Landau et al., 14 
2006; Augustin & Leder, 2006; Leder et al. 2012), our results strengthen the finding that 15 
naïve viewers evaluate representational art more favorably than abstract art. This was not 16 
the main focus of the current research, but it is of note that this relatively robust finding was 17 
replicated in our research, as it provides evidence that our work calibrates well with prior 18 
work in this respect. This, in turn, suggests that our artworks and participants were not 19 
systematically different from those used in previous research, providing some confidence 20 
that our findings can be generalized beyond the current sets of raters and artworks. 21 
 22 
A reservation that we need to express regarding our work is that we asked observers to 23 
generate external responses to artworks so that these could be rated. While these 24 
responses were readily provided, and subsequently readily rated, we cannot be sure that the 25 
UCAV method reflects the internal process by which observers would ordinarily respond to 26 
artworks, or whether, instead, our method distorts the process of viewing art, so that it no 27 
longer represents it. It is our view that, although this reservation exists in theory, given the 28 
22 
 
readiness with which the task was completed, it is likely that our method simply externalized 1 
spontaneously and naturally occurring processes, rather than forcing these unnaturally. It is 2 
possible that this specific question could be further probed in future research.  3 
 4 
Conclusion 5 
 6 
We found that observer ratings for representational artworks converge to a greater extent 7 
than those for abstract artworks. Our work also confirms that this convergence in aesthetic 8 
appreciation is linked to the generation of semantic associations whose valence converges 9 
more in response to representational than abstract art. Further, the findings show that 10 
semantic associations play an important role in observer responses to representational 11 
artworks, but may play a lesser role in the evaluation of abstract artworks. Finally our work 12 
suggests a number of specific questions for future research. In particular, we believe it would 13 
be interesting to examine whether the content of the associations generated by abstract and 14 
representational artworks overlap to differing degrees. 15 
 16 
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